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I Comments I
Reconciling the Split: Affording
Reasonable Accommodation to Employees
"Regarded As" Disabled Under the ADA-
An Exercise in Statutory Interpretation
Jonathan D. Andrews*
1. Introduction
For centuries, society has treated disabled persons unfairly.' Since
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of Pennsylvania State University,
2006. B.A., with distinction, Pennsylvania State University, 2003. Special thanks are
owed to those who mentored me in my pursuit of a legal education, especially the
Honorable Judge Richard W. Webb, the Nanovic family, Prof. Beth Cook, and Prof.
Harvey Feldman. I would also like to thank my peers for reviewing this comment,
including: Michael R. Boland, Matthew S. Draper, Kris E. Harrison, Michael I. Kaplan,
Marcy L. McCullough and Anthony W. Rodgers. Thank you to my family for their
unwavering support throughout my academic endeavors. Finally, I would like to thank
Danelle for her constant love and encouragement.
1. "[N]othing could be more essential to personality, social existence, economic
opportunity-in short, to individual well-being and integration into the life of the
community-than... the public approval." Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers, Achieving
the Right to Live in the World, in AMERICANS wiTH DISABILITIES xiii (Leslie Francis &
Anita Silvers, eds., 2000) [hereinafter FRANCIS & SILVERS], citing Jacobus tenBroek, The
Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 841
(1966).
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the 1970s, the United States government has attempted to ensure the fair
treatment of disabled persons.2 Representative government initiatives for
disabled persons include ensuring fair hiring opportunities3 and
providing easier access to public accommodations.4 One key assistance
program, the ADA, requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodations in the workplace, thereby creating an equal work
environment for all employees. 5 Unfortunately, the government and the
courts have left unresolved the issue of whether impaired persons-those
who are not actually disabled, but who are perceived to be disabled by
their employers-must be reasonably accommodated.
Imagine a scenario in which a coworker accuses another employee
of making violent threats, prompting the employer to require the
offending employee to be psychologically evaluated.6 As a result, the
employee then misses the psychological exam because he suffers a heart
attack.7 The employer subsequently places the employee on compulsory
sick leave for several months before terminating the employee for failure
to take a psychological exam.
8
The employee in this hypothetical is not actually disabled; his
employer, however, categorized him as disabled for several months
while he was on sick leave. Should the law compel the employer to
accommodate the employee who is impaired, but not actually disabled,
simply because the employer mistakenly perceived the employee to be
disabled? Requiring accommodation would be unfair, because those
employees who are equally impaired, but not mistakenly perceived as
disabled, would not receive equal treatment. 9 Some courts, however,
have ruled that this result is what the law requires.' °
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA or
the Act) in 1990.11 Congress found that there were over forty-three
million disabled Americans1 2 and that disabled Americans, just like
2. See generally Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.(1973), amended by 29
U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq. (1998). See also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (1990).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
4. See id. § 12182.
5. See Kaplan v. N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The ADA
represents a Congressional judgment that an individual's education, experience, will to
succeed, and adaptability may often overcome mere disability.").




9. See id. at *14.
10. See discussion infra Part III.A. 1-3.
11. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
12. Seeid. § 12101(a)(1).
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minorities, were often the victims of discrimination.' 3 Congress intended
the ADA to abolish the widespread discrimination against disabled
persons.1 4 This intent is evidenced by the language of the statute itself,
which notes Congress passed Title I of the ADA in an effort to confront
private employers that discriminate against people with disabilities.
15
Congress defined the term "disability" broadly. 16 An individual is
considered disabled for purposes of the Act if he has an actual handicap,
or, if he is "regarded as" having a handicap.' 7 If courts interpret this
broad definition literally, any employee who is mistakenly "regarded as"
disabled by his employer falls under the purview of the ADA and
therefore must be "reasonably accommodated."' 8  According to the
United States Supreme Court, "a person is 'regarded as' disabled within
the meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly believes that the
person's actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more
major life activities."' 19 This expansive designation is ambiguous in light
of the general gate-keeping function of the ADA's definition section. 0
The literal application of the "disability" definition yields odd
results that do not effectuate Congressional intent.2' The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have recognized the "bizarre results" of interpreting the
ADA so broadly 22 and have ruled that employers are not required to
reasonably accommodate employees who are mistakenly "regarded as"
13. See id. § 12101(a)(2).
14. See id. § 12101(b); see also FRANCIS & SILVERS, supra note 1, at xix, citing
President's Commission on Employment of People with Disabilities, Workiife, Special
ADA Issue vol. 3, no. 3, p.11 (Fall 1990) (quoting President George H.W. Bush, who
said when he signed the Act that the country was "taking a sledgehammer.., to a wall
which has, for too many generations, separated Americans with disabilities from the
freedom they could glimpse, but not grasp").
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
16. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The
limited legislative history also confirms that Congress' primary concern in enacting the
,regarded as' prong of the ADA was for individuals with no limitations but who, because
of some non-limiting impairment, are prevented from obtaining employment as a result
of societal prejudices.").
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). The ADA defines a disability as (1) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities; (2) a
record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
18. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999).
19. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1999).
20. See FRANICS & SILVERS, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that only those persons who
qualify as "disabled" under the ADA definition are entitled to protection under the ADA).
21. See id. (discussing that the underlying issue revolves around what is one's
philosophical view of disability). Perhaps Congress viewed a disability as a feature of
the individual-a biological or medical personal limitation-or a feature of society-a
social limitation imposed on people in virtue of their physical or mental differences. Id.
22. See Kaplan v. N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber, 186
F.3d at 916.
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disabled.23
The British government has recognized the paradox of requiring
employers to accommodate employees "regarded as" disabled, and
therefore, refused to include that provision in the United Kingdom's
Disability Discrimination Act, which is largely modeled after the ADA.24
Nonetheless, the Third and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted and
applied the "regarded as" clause of the ADA based on its plain language,
to require employers to provide reasonable accommodations.25
This comment addresses the current state of this deep divide among
the circuit courts regarding the issue of whether employers must
accommodate employees who are merely "regarded as" disabled. Part II
of this comment reviews the legislative and judicial background of the
Rehabilitation Act 26 and the ADA, as well as the administrative remedies
available under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
guidelines for applying the ADA.27 Part II-A of this comment then
examines prominent case law on each side of the issue. 28 Part III-B of
this comment analyzes the circuit courts' use and misuse of various
methods of statutory interpretation. Part III-C criticizes the decisions of
the Third and Eleventh Circuits that created this circuit split. Ultimately,
Part IV suggests that the United States Supreme Court should, once and




Congress first addressed employment discrimination against
23. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232-33; Weber, 186 F.3d at 917; see also Fontanilla v.
S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 WL 513395, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001).
24. See RUTH COLKER, ET AL., THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 124 (4th ed.,
Anderson Publishing Co., 2003) citing United Kingdom's Disability Discrimination Act,
1995, c. 50 (Eng.).
25. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1725; D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220,
1235 (11 th Cir. 2005); see also Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.
1996). But see Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (a
ruling from only six years ago that contradicts the Third Circuit's recent ruling in
Williams).
26. Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1973), amended by 29 U.S.C.
§§ 794 et seq. (1998).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2004).
28. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 751; Katz, 87 F.3d at 26; Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.,
200 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); cf. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1226; Weber, 186 F.3d at
907; Fontanilla, 2001 WL 513395, at *1.
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disabled persons in 1973 with the passage of the Rehabilitation Act.29
The Rehabilitation Act requires federal agencies and federal contractors
to affirmatively hire the handicapped3" and prohibits discrimination on
the basis of handicap status by federal agencies and in programs
receiving federal financial assistance.
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act to end discrimination
against handicapped individuals.32  The Rehabilitation Act defines
"handicapped individuals" as those persons with actual impairments or
those persons with perceived impairments.33 While this language
appears plain, the courts perceived ambiguity that required judicial
resolution.
The first judicial recognition of the intrinsic problems created by
requiring employers to accommodate employees who are "regarded as"
handicapped arose in 1987. In School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline,34 the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the Rehabilitation Act applied to an elementary school teacher who was
afflicted with tuberculosis. 35  The teacher argued that tuberculosis
qualified her as a "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act
because her school regarded her as handicapped.36 The Supreme Court
held that under the plain language of the Rehabilitation Act employers
must reasonably accommodate employees who, while not actually
handicapped, are "regarded as" handicapped.37
Justice Brennan authored the opinion of the Court and explained
that Congress intended for a broad definition of "handicapped," which
included persons "regarded as" handicapped. 3 Justice Brennan reasoned
that Congress used the broad definition in an effort to "combat the effects
of erroneous but nevertheless prevalent perceptions about the
handicapped., 39 However, Justice Brennan noted that the original focus
29. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 etseq.
30. Id. §§ 791,793.
31. Id. § 794.
32. Id. ("No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ... ").
33. Id. § 706(7)(B) ("[A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.").
34. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
35. Id. at 275.
36. Id. at 277.
37. Id. at 289.
38. Id. at 279.
39. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (citing Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
405-06 n.6 (1979)); see also S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6400 (noting Congress's concern with not only simple prejudice against
2006]
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of the Rehabilitation Act was to provide better employment opportunities
for those persons who were actually handicapped.4 ° Congress introduced
the broader definition of handicapped, including the "regarded as"
clause, later because it determined the legislation's aim would be at
education, housing and employment.4 '
Despite these reservations, Justice Brennan endorsed the broad
definition of "handicapped.'A42 He noted that people could have
impairments that do not substantially limit major life activities but that
could limit their ability to work because of negative reactions from
others to the impairments.43
In what has become the battle cry for those who support the
inclusion of the "regarded as" clause in the definitions of "handicapped"
(Rehabilitation Act) and "disabled" (ADA), Justice Brennan reasoned
that Congress intended to require employers to reasonably accommodate
employees who are only "regarded as" handicapped because Congress
"acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations
that flow from actual impairment.,
44
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, criticized the
majority for ignoring the inherent ambiguity of the Rehabilitation Act.45
The Chief Justice reasoned that when determining whether a reasonable
accommodation must be afforded, others' reaction should not be
separated from the actual effect of the claimant's condition.46 He went
on to criticize the generality of the Rehabilitation Act 47 and implied that
the Court and Congress should look to the purpose behind the plain, yet
persons who were actually handicapped but also protecting those persons regarded as
handicapped who are discriminated against by "archaic attitudes and laws" and the
insensitivity of the American people).
40. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 n.3.
41. S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 16, 37-38, 50 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6400; see also 120 CONG. REc. 30531 (1974) (including the statement of Sen. Cranston
urging Congress to protect individuals who were "regarded as" handicapped that suffer
from the same discrimination as persons who were actually handicapped).
42. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282.
43. Id. at 283.
44. Id. at 284; see also S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50; Jacobus TenBroek & Floyd W.
Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REv. 809, 814 (1966); ANSELM
STRAUSS, CHRONIC ILLNESS, The Sociology of Health and Illness 138, 146-47 (P. Conrad
& R. Kern eds., 1981).
45. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
accused the Court of ignoring its own jurisprudence and instead "resting its holding on its
own sense of fairness and implied support from the [Rehabilitation] Act." Id. at 290
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 292 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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ambiguous, language when interpreting the Rehabilitation Act.
4 8
Congress failed to heed this criticism when it enacted the ADA.
B. Americans with Disabilities Act
Congress drafted the Rehabilitation Act more narrowly than its
successor, the ADA.49 At the time of the Rehabilitation Act's enactment,
both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196450 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 51 were already in force.
These statutes contained much broader remedial measures that applied in
both the public and private sectors.52 In 1990, Congress enacted the
ADA, which is an expanded version of the Rehabilitation Act.53  The
ADA broadened coverage of the Rehabilitation Act to include the private
sector, not just the public sector.
54
In the ADA, Congress defined "disabled" by using language
strikingly similar to that found in the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
"handicapped individual."5 5  In fact, it appears as though Congress
simply copied the Rehabilitation Act's language in the ADA. This
legislative action makes little sense in light of the acknowledged
confusion that surrounded the "regarded as" clause within the definition
of "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act.56
Unfortunately, Congress failed to clarify the Rehabilitation Act's
ambiguities when drafting the definition of "disabled" in the ADA. The
ADA definition of "disability" was taken almost word for word from the
48. Id. at 293 n.5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see Oversight Hearings on
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 503 (1978) (citing the remarks
of Representative Hyde, of Illinois, who said Congress should be mindful of "public
safety, economics, and commonsense" when addressing the concerns of handicapped
persons) (emphasis added).
49. See MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN A
NUTSHELL 331 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter PLAYER] (explaining that the Rehabilitation Act
is limited to federal employees, subcontractors, and programs receiving federal funding).
50. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq. (2003).
51. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2003).
52. See PLAYER, supra note 49, at 331.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 197.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
55. Compare id. § 12102(2)(A-C), defining "disabled" under the ADA, with the
definition of "handicapped individuals" under the Rehabilitation Act, with 29 U.S.C.
§ 794. The Rehabilitation Act defines "handicapped individuals" as "any person who
(A) has a physical or mental impairment, which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded
as having such an impairment." Id.
56. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987) (addressing
the "regarded as" clause found at 29 U.S.C. § 794).
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definition of "handicapped" in the Rehabilitation Act. 7 As Congress
failed to use clearer language or to explain why it again included the
"regarded as" clause, 58 the issue of whether employers were required to
accommodate employees merely "regarded as" disabled remained
unresolved at the time of the ADA's enactment.
C. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines
With the enactment of the ADA, courts have turned to
administrative guides to aid in the interpretation of the Act's "regarded
as" clause. Congress explicitly authorized the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to issue guidelines for implementing
and enforcing the ADA.59 These guidelines provide that an individual is
"regarded as" disabled if he:
(1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as
constituting such a limitation; (2) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a
result of the attitude of others toward such impairment; or (3) has
none of the impairments defined in earlier subsections of this section
but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment.
60
Additionally, the EEOC guidelines conclude that Congress
intentionally retained "regarded as" in the definition of "disabled"
because of the Supreme Court's ruling in Arline.6 1 Unfortunately, the
EEOC guidelines do not add any substance to the discussion of whether
employers must accommodate employees who are "regarded as"
62disabled. Instead, the EEOC guidelines simply restate Justice
Brennan's reliance on the plain language of the Rehabilitation Act as
justification for retaining the same definition in the ADA.63
Congress and the EEOC have relied upon the Arline decision as
57. 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("[A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.").
58. If Congress' intention was to adopt the Supreme Court's Arline interpretation,
the legislators would most likely have referenced the Arline decision in the legislative
notes during the ADA's passage.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
61. Id. § 1630 app. I. These guidelines, however, provide no evidence that Congress
explicitly intended to adopt the Arline standard.
62. The guidelines go no further than recognizing and agreeing with the reasoning in
Arline. The guidelines do not provide any other arguments regarding why the Arline
interpretation is applicable.
63. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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justification to retain the "regarded as" clause in the ADA. The Supreme
Court never should have applied the "regarded as" clause of the
Rehabilitation Act in Arline. The record demonstrates that the plaintiff
in Arline suffered from tuberculosis twenty years prior to her relapse.
64
Having been previously diagnosed with a contagious disease, which the
Court held was a handicap,65 Arline should have been granted protection
under the Rehabilitation Act based on the previous "record" clause
within the paragraph defining "handicap," not the "regarded as" clause.66
An analysis of the "regarded as" clause was absolutely unnecessary.
Thus, while the result of Arline is justifiable, the reasoning behind
the decision is flawed.67 Arline's holding should be limited to its facts,
and the Court's interpretation of the "regarded as" clause should be
treated as no more than dicta. Since the passage of the ADA, some
courts have recognized that the Arline decision does not really apply to
the ADA.68 Judges in other jurisdictions have relied on Arline for
guidance in interpreting the "regarded as" clause in the definition of
disability under the ADA.69 However, as discussed above, those cases
have failed to recognize the mistakes of the Arline majority.
Since Arline is properly seen as distinguishable, the federal circuit
courts have no guidance from the Supreme Court for interpreting the
"regarded as" clause of the ADA. Many courts have taken the
opportunity to apply techniques of statutory interpretation to determine
the meaning of "regarded as." Regrettably, those courts have not
reached a consensus.
III. Analysis
Commentators often state that the legislative branch makes the law,
the executive branch enforces the law, and the judicial branch interprets
the law. 70 The exercise of statutory interpretation is an example of these
64. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1987).
65. See id. at 289.
66. See Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. A handicapped individual includes one
who has an actual physical or mental impairment and also one who "[has] a record of
such impairment." Id. § 274(B).
67. See generally Arline, 480 U.S. 289-93 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Court's
choice of canons of statutory interpretation was jaded by the jurisprudential and political
concerns of each individual justice, with the majority being a coalition of justices who
were afraid a narrower interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act would endanger the
remedial nature of the Act. Id.
68. See, e.g., Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998).
69. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1725; Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 165-
67 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
70. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1-5 (1999) [hereinafter PoPKIN] (discussing competing
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roles. 71 At first glance, statutes usually appear to be clear statements of
the law that are easy to apply.7 2  However, when those seemingly
unambiguous statutes are applied to certain sets of facts, ambiguities in
the language can arise which require the judiciary to determine the
meaning of the language in question.73
A. Judicial Treatment
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the federal circuit courts began
addressing the issue of whether employers must afford reasonable
accommodation to employees who are "regarded as" disabled.74 Since
that time a "circuit split" has arisen, which was recently deepened by the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling in D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. 7 The
courts that have required reasonable accommodation have relied on the
plain language of the ADA, choosing to ignore the potentially "bizarre
results" of such an interpretation.
1. Katz v. City Metal, Inc.
In 1996, the First Circuit rendered the first decision interpreting
"regarded as" in the ADA.7 6 Alexander Katz was employed by City
Metal, Inc.77 In September 1992, Katz suffered a heart attack and
underwent two angioplasty procedures.78 Katz was unable to return to
work immediately because of shortness of breath.79 City Metal placed
Katz on temporary disability leave, but subsequently decided to
discharge him on October 31, 1992.80 Katz sought to return on a part-
views of what should be each branch's role); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE].
71. See RONALD B. BROWN & SHARON J. BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE
SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 1-3 (2002) [hereinafter BROWN & BROWN] (providing a
concise explanation of the importance of statutory interpretation).
72. See JULIO C. CUETo-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW 94
(1981) [hereinafter CUETO-RUA].
73. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 2.
74. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 773 (including examples of circuit court rulings that
employers must afford reasonable accommodation); Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d
26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996). But see Kaplan v. N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir.
2003); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d
276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998) (providing examples of circuit court rulings that held that a
reasonable accommodation was unnecessary).
75. D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
76. Katz, 87 F.3d at 33.
77. Id. at 28.
78. Id.




time basis in a less strenuous position, but City Metal declined to
accommodate him.81
Katz filed suit against City Metal, claiming violation of the ADA
for failure to afford reasonable accommodation to a disabled person.
82
At trial, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of
City Metal. It held that Katz was not covered under the ADA's
definition of a disabled person because Katz's heart attack did not cause
a permanent impairment to any of his major life activities.83
The First Circuit reversed, and it relied instead on the plain
language of the ADA and the policy that led to the statute's enactment.
84
The court held that on its face, the ADA requires reasonable
accommodation of employees who are "regarded as" disabled by their
employers.85
Additionally, the court cited EEOC guidelines, which state that an
individual is "disabled" if he is "treated by the employer as having an
impairment that does substantially limit major life activities. ' 86 Finally,
the court reasoned that although Congress probably intended the ADA to
apply primarily to those individuals who were actually disabled, the Act
should also apply when the employee is only mistakenly perceived as
disabled.87
81. Katz, 87 F.3d at 29.
82. Id. at 30.
83. Id. at 29.
84. See id. at 32-33; see also Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (advancing the arguments originally made by the First Circuit in Katz).
In Jacques, the plaintiff was a parts assembler, at a guitar plant, who suffered from
numerous psychiatric disorders. See id. at 54-55. She was eventually terminated after
several conflicts with her coworkers. See id. The Jacques court noted that nowhere in
the definition section of the ADA did Congress differentiate between "actually disabled"
employees and employees who were "regarded as" disabled. See id. at 166.
85. See Katz, 87 F.3d at 33; see also Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 160, citing
Giordano v. New York, 274 F.3d 740, 748 (2d Cir. 2001). In Jacques, the court stated
that an employee can be "regarded as" disabled when: 1) an employer mistakenly thinks
an employee has an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;
or 2) an employer mistakenly thinks that an actual disability, that is a non-limiting
impairment, nonetheless substantially limits one or more major life activities. See
Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 160, citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
In addition to the plain language of the ADA, the Jacques court relied on the legislative
history surrounding the enactment of the ADA, and the mandatory interactive process of
the ADA. See Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
86. Katz, 87 F.3d at 32, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1).
87. See Katz, 87 F.3d at 33. See also Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166-68 (favoring
reasonable accommodation for those persons "regarded as" disabled based on the same
policy arguments set forth by the Supreme Court in Arline). The Jacques court noted that
denying reasonable accommodation would "allow the prejudices and biases of others to
impermissibly deny an impaired employee his or her job because of the mistaken
perception that the employee suffers from an actual disability." Id. at 168.
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2. Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Dept.
Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals deepened the current
circuit split. In Williams, the Third Circuit, employing reasoning similar
to that utilized by the Katz court, required employers to reasonably
accommodate employees who are regarded as disabled.8 8  This ruling
came as a surprise to some commentators in light of the Third Circuit's
earlier jurisprudence.89
In Williams, the plaintiff sued his employer for discrimination under
the ADA for his employer's failure to reasonably accommodate what he
considered to be his disability.90 Williams was employed as a guard by
the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) for twenty-four years, but in
1998, he began to experience mental and emotional difficulties and
threatened several of his coworkers.9' PHA transferred Williams to the
radio room, away from active guard duty.92 Williams started to miss
work repeatedly, and the PHA responded by requiring Williams to
undergo a psychological examination.93 Williams sought a medical leave
of absence after being diagnosed with major depression.94
After his medical leave was exhausted, PHA requested that
Williams either return to work or file a request for an extended leave.95
When Williams asked to return to work, PHA required him to undergo
another psychological examination.96 The results of the exam included a
recommendation that Williams should not carry a firearm if he returned
to work.9 7 Williams requested to return to work in the radio room, but
PHA supervisors did not feel comfortable with Williams around any
firearms, including those that other officers would be carrying.98 PHA
88. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1725.
89. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998). While
the Third Circuit did not adopt a position on the "regarded as" issue, it did "acknowledge
the considerable force" of the arguments against a plain meaning interpretation that
would afford reasonable accommodation to those "regarded as" disabled. Id. at 148 n. 12.
See also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1999). See
generally Allen Dudley, Note, Rights to Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act for "Regarded As" Disabled Individuals, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 389, 414 (1999); Padmaja Chivukula, Note, Is Ignorance Bliss? A Pennsylvania
Employer 's Obligation to Provide Reasonable Accommodation to Employees it Regards
as "Disabled" After Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, Inc., 41 DUQ. L. REv. 541, 556 (2003).
90. Williams, 380 F.3d at 758.
91. Id. at 756-57.
92. Id. at 756.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Williams, 380 F.3d at 756.





required Williams to seek an extended medical leave of absence rather
than return to work.99 When Williams did not respond to this request,
PHA terminated his employment because of his missed work and
exhaustion of sick leave. 00
The Third Circuit noted that PHA clearly regarded Williams as
disabled; this illustrates PHA's contention that not only should Williams
not carry a firearm but also that he should not be around others who
carried firearms.' 0 ' The Third Circuit adopted the reasoning of the court
in Jacques.'0 2 In addition to relying on the plain language and legislative
history of the ADA, the Third Circuit interpreted Arline as "requir[ing]
that 'regarded as' employees be entitled to reasonable
accommodations."'10 3  The Third Circuit went on to critique the
arguments of PHA and the reasoning of the cases it cited.'
0 4
Overall, Williams has not added much substantive material to the
debate because the decision simply mirrored the reasoning in Jacques,
but it did unexpectedly deepen'0 5 the split among the circuit courts.
0 6
The Supreme Court denied PHA's writ of certiorari and declined an
opportunity to resolve the circuit split.
0 7
3. D 'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.
The Eleventh Circuit is the most recent court to address this issue.'0 8
99. Id. at 758.
100. Williams, 380 F.3d at 758.
101. Id. at 766.
102. Id. at 773; see also supra notes 84-87.
103. Id. at 775.
104. Id. The Third Circuit adopted the plain meaning statutory interpretation canon.
Id. The court commented in passing that the Weber and Kaplan decisions simply did not
apply. See id.
105. The deepened split was unexpected in light of the Third Circuit's dicta in Deane,
which was seemingly contradicted by the court's subsequent ruling in Williams. See
Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Taylor v.
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1999); cf Williams, 380 F.3d at
773-76.
106. Now the Third Circuit (Williams) is aligned with the First Circuit (Katz) in
requiring employers to reasonably accommodate employees who are "regarded as"
disabled. On the other side of the issue remains the Eighth Circuit (Weber), the Ninth
Circuit (Kaplan), and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, which have issued rulings denying
reasonable accommodation to employees "regarded as" disabled, without providing any
analysis in the relevant opinions. See Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467
(6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998).
107. Williams, 125 S.Ct. 1725 (2004).
108. See D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (1lth Cir. 2005); see also
Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh
Circuit did not need to rule on the "regarded as" issue but did mention in dicta "[b]eing
regarded as disabled is a form of disability under the statute and thus could in principle
trigger a duty to accommodate." Id. Judge Easterbrook did, however, imply that the
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In ConAgra, Cris D'Angelo suffered from vertigo, which prevented her
from working at the spreader machine in the ConAgra seafood packaging
plant. 109 D'Angelo reported her condition to her shift'and plant managers
and provided a physician's note requesting certain work restrictions.'10
ConAgra determined that all other available positions required work in
front of a conveyor belt, and, therefore, the company terminated
D'Angelo."'1
Alleging that the company violated the ADA, and similar provisions
in the Florida Civil Rights Act,112 D'Angelo sued ConAgra. She claimed
ConAgra discriminated against her for both her actual disability and
because the employer regarded her as disabled.1 13  The district court
granted ConAgra's motion for summary judgment on the actual
disability claim.1 14  The court also granted ConAgra's motion on the
"regarded as" claim, ruling that someone who is merely "regarded as"
disabled is not entitled to reasonable accommodation. 
15
The Eleventh Circuit joined the Third Circuit by adopting the plain
language reasoning from Williams.116 The court began by determining
whether the ADA's language is plain and unambiguous.1 7 The Eleventh
Circuit reviewed the ADA's plain language and determined that the
Act's "prohibition on discrimination applies equally to all statutorily
defined disabilities [including 'regarded as']."' 18 The Eleventh Circuit,
like the Third Circuit, recognized the importance of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act in Arline.'
1 9
The Eleventh Circuit disregarded the analyses made by courts on
the other side of the circuit split. 20 The ConAgra court reasoned that the
"bizarre results" argument preferred by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
"ignores the vital principle that '[c]ourts are not authorized to rewrite a
Third Circuit's analysis in Williams might conflict with the Supreme Court's analysis in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). See Cigan, 388 F.3d at 335-
36.
109. ConAgra, 422 F.3d at 1221-23. The spreader machine was a part of a conveyor
belt operation that D'Angelo alleged made her sick and dizzy. Id. at 1222.
I10. Id. at 1223. The requested work restrictions included not working around any
moving belts and not working more than five nights a week. Id. The five night
restriction was not related to D'Angelo's vertigo but rather her bout with hepatitis and the
flu. Id.
111. Id. at 1223-24.
112. See FLA. STAT. § 760.01 et. seq. (2005).
113. ConAgra, 422 F.3d at 1224.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1235.
117. Id; see also discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
118. ConAgra, 422 F.3d at 1236.
119. Id.
120. See discussion infra Part III.A.4-5.
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statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of
improvement.' 121 The Eleventh Circuit went so far as to say that
Congress may, within constitutional limits, enact laws such as the ADA
that would create a "windfall" for employees "regarded as" disabled.
22
The court concluded that the plain language of the ADA was
unambiguous; the court noted that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits did not
cite any congressional findings indicating that there was an ambiguity
that would lead statutory interpretation beyond the plain meaning
approach.1
23
The First, Third and Eleventh Circuits relied primarily on the plain
language of the ADA. The plain language, however, is often
ambiguous. 124  Even the legislative history, often cited as instructive,
behind a statute can prove misleading when used to interpret the plain
language. Often, the application of a statute to facts renders absurd
results that the legislature could not have intended. This line of
reasoning is advanced by the courts that oppose the rulings in Katz and
Jacques and that would likely oppose the more recent rulings in Williams
and ConAgra.
4. Weber v. Strippit, Inc.
Three years after the First Circuit addressed the "regarded as" issue
in Katz, the Eighth Circuit issued a contrary ruling in Weber v. Strippit,
Inc.'25 The Eighth Circuit's analysis in Weber moved beyond the plain
language arguments found in Katz and its progeny. Instead, the Eighth
Circuit addressed the potential results of applying the plain language of
the ADA.'26
From 1990 until 1994, Strippit employed David Weber as an
international sales manager. 27 Weber suffered a severe heart attack in
February 1993 and was hospitalized in intensive care for nine days.
121. ConAgra, 422 F.3d at 1238, citing Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1552
(11 th Cir. 1996).
122. ConAgra, 422 F.3d at 1238. The Eleventh Circuit admitted there may be
situations where its interpretation of the "regarded as" clause could lead to "bizarre
results" but was unwilling to adopt an "across-the-board" rule like the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits. Id. at 1239.
123. Id.
124. See TIMOTHY A. 0. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS 1N LAW 7 (2000) [hereinafter
ENDICOTT]; see also ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Statutory Interpretation in the United States,
in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 408-11 (1991) [hereinafter
SUMMERS].
125. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999).
126. See id. at 916-17.
127. Id.at9lo.
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After being released, Strippit placed Weber on restricted physical duty. 2
On numerous occasions later in 1993 and again in 1994, Weber was
hospitalized for heart problems, including hypertension.1 29  In 1994,
Strippit informed Weber that he would lose his job if he did not transfer
to Ohio.130  Weber requested to stay in Minnesota for six months to
receive medical treatment, but Strippit denied the request and terminated
Weber's employment.131
Weber sued Strippit for violation of the ADA based on his actual
and perceived disabilities. 32 The district court entered judgment as a
matter of law in favor of Strippit; Weber appealed. 133 The Eighth Circuit
held that plaintiffs like Weber could not rely on the plain language of the
ADA because "reasonable accommodation... makes considerably less
sense in the perceived disability context."'
134
The court concluded that it would lead to "bizarre results" if
employers had to reasonably accommodate employees who were merely
mistakenly perceived disabled. 35 The court relied on reasoning from the
Third Circuit's dicta in Deane, which explained that healthy employees
would receive a "windfall" of reasonable accommodations that their
similarly situated healthy coworkers would not get merely because of a
mistake by the employer. 36 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Congress
could not possibly have intended the ADA to have such bizarre
applications. 37 The court noted that when reliance on the plain language
of a statute leads to absurd results, the court should look beyond that
plain language. 38 The Eighth Circuit specifically relied on the Third
Circuit's dicta in Deane because the Eighth Circuit found the "bizarre
results" argument more compelling than the plain language argument.
39
5. Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit rendered its holding in Kaplan, the most
recent case prior to Williams to address the "regarded as" issue. In
Kaplan, the Ninth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Weber, 186 F.3d at 910.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 911.
133. Id. at 910.
134. Id. at 916.
135. Weber, 186 F.3d at 916.
136. Id. at 917, citing Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148-49 n. 12; see
also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 195 (3d. Cir. 1999).







The city of North Las Vegas employed Kaplan as a peace officer.
141
Kaplan injured himself during a training session. 42 After the accident,
Kaplan was no longer able to hold a weapon and was misdiagnosed with
rheumatoid arthritis by a doctor while receiving therapy. 143 The city did
not know the diagnosis was incorrect and relied on the misdiagnosis
when it terminated Kaplan for his inability to fulfill his duties. 44 Kaplan
sued the city for violation of the ADA based on its failure to
accommodate his perceived disability.1
45
The Ninth Circuit noted that all exercises of statutory interpretation
begin with a reading of the plain language of the statute, but when that
language is ambiguous, or leads to "bizarre results," the court cannot rely
upon the plain language. 146 One option not explored by the Ninth Circuit
in Kaplan was to turn to the rest of the ADA for assistance in interpreting
the statute.
147
The Kaplan court adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning process in
Weber as the proper interpretation of the "regarded as" clause of the
ADA. 48 The court reasoned that employees themselves are often best
suited to dispel stereotypes. 149 If the court were to rely upon the plain
language of the ADA, the court would permit a windfall for employees,
rather than educate their employers about their perceived disabilities. 50
Thus, courts should interpret the ADA in light of the potentially "bizarre
results" that could arise from a rather simplistic application of the plain
language of the Act. This argument was dismissed with little
justification by the Third Circuit in Williams.' 
51
140. Kaplan v. N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Fontanilla v. S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 WL 513395, at *1-*7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
2001). This 2001 district court case provided the earliest foundation for the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Kaplan. In Fontanilla, the City and County terminated an
employee after they mistakenly believed he was too disabled to fulfill his work duties.
See id.
141. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1227.




146. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231-32; see also Fontanilla, 2001 WL 513395, at *14.
147. See Fontanilla, 2001 WL 513395, at * 15. The court could also have relied upon
the legislative history or EEOC guidelines. Id. at *15-16.
148. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232.
149. Id. (discussing that one of the ADA's goals is to dispel stereotypes).
150. Id.; see also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999).
151. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir.
2004) (stating that it makes little sense to implement an "across-the-board refusal"
because of potential "bizarre results"), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725.
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B. Statutory Interpretation
In the federal appellate courts, the process of statutory interpretation
arguably is often outcome-driven. 152 This method of decision-making
occurs due to the policy-making nature of the courts' role. Some
commentators have argued that judges determine what outcome they
desire for the case and then select the most appropriate method of
statutory interpretation for reaching that outcome. 153  When selecting
methods of statutory interpretation, the "normative" terms judges give to
their own behavior often influence their decision-making. 1
54
An example of this behavior can be seen when two courts differ in
the interpretation of the plain language of a statute. If one court favors
the straightforward application of the statute to the facts of the case at
hand, the court will find no ambiguity and rely on the plain language of
the statute. 155 If a court disagrees with how the plain language of a
statute should apply to the facts, the court can find the statute ambiguous
and then rely on other canons of statutory interpretation in order to reach
a more "just result."'
' 56
Such judicial discretion is unpredictable but necessary because no
two people read a statute exactly alike. Latent statutory ambiguities can
arise any time after drafting. 157 The English language is far too complex
for legislators to draft a perfectly unambiguous statute; not to mention
the fact that the meanings of words change over time. 158 Nevertheless,
courts must address ambiguous statutes and render an interpretation in
order to resolve the case at hand and provide some guidance for future
application of the statute.
1. Plain Language
In matters involving statutory interpretation, courts often begin with
a plain meaning interpretation of the statute. 159  The plain meaning
152. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 26-27, citing POPKIN, supra note 70, at
207-56 (discussing what Popkin refers to as "ordinary judging"). The judge must
conform the statute, through the interpretation process, to the past, present, and future
legal landscape. Id. But how a judge views the legal landscape, or what the future legal
landscape will be, skews the judge's interpretation of that statute. Id.
153. See id.
154. See CUETO-RUA, supra note 72, at 25-27 (maintaining predispositions respecting
the roles of certain parties in society, and the moral foundations of those roles, impact
judicial decision-making).
155. See, e.g., Williams, 380 F.3d at 774.
156. See, e.g., Kaplan v. N. Las.Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
157. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 1.
158. See id. at 2. Consider, for example, how parties differ over the meaning of "is."
159. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231, citing Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal, Corp.,
270 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in
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approach is by far the most popular canon of modem statutory
interpretation. 160 This approach has gained popularity in recent decades
because it relies heavily on the language of the statute and gives judges
less discretion. 161 The United States Supreme Court has adopted the
plain meaning canon as a preferred method of statutory interpretation
because it is a safe assumption that legislatures intended the words of the
statute to convey their ordinary meaning. 162 According to this canon, if
the plain meaning of a statute is clear, then no other method of
interpretation is necessary.
163
Despite the widespread acceptance of this canon, the plain meaning
approach is not always satisfactory. Clearly, at least one of the parties
had sufficient reason to believe the language is unclear if the court is
asked to engage in statutory interpretation.164 Due to the complexity of
the English language, what may appear clear to one person will appear
ambiguous to another. 65 Statutes can have "countless indeterminancies"
in "linguistic formulations," including lexical and syntactical
ambiguities. 
66
Ignoring the inherent flaws of the plain language method, the courts
that have ruled that employers must reasonably accommodate employees
"regarded as" disabled have relied on the Act's plain language. Most
recently in ConAgra, and earlier in Katz, Jacques and Williams, the
courts relied on the plain meaning approach as their primary argument
for requiring reasonable accommodation of employees "regarded as"
disabled. 67 In ConAgra, the court reasoned that the text of the ADA
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is
plain, . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."); see also
D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005), quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (explaining that the first step "is to
determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute in the case").
160. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 38.
161. See POPKIN, supra note 70, at 153 (noting the modem textualist movement is
pessimistic about judging and favors significantly limiting the role of judges in the
statutory interpretation process).
162. See, e.g., Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
163. See, e.g., Greenwood v. U.S., 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956).
164. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 39; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 70, at
9 (discussing the flaws of how the plain meaning approach treats statutes as static texts
rather than dynamic and coining the phrase "insufficiency of statutory archaeology").
165. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 39. See also CUETO-RUA, supra note
72, at 96-102 (discussing the general vagueness of words in relation to their referents).
166. ENDICOTT, supra note 124, at 7; see also SUMMERS, supra note 124, at 408-11.
167. See D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (1 1th Cir. 2005);
Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct 1725; Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996);
Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
2006]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
plainly mandated reasonable accommodation. 168 In contrast, the Weber
and Kaplan courts found the ADA to be ambiguous, and, therefore,
engaged in much more dynamic methods of interpretation.'
69
The cursory discussions of the alleged plain meaning of the ADA
fail to resolve the inherent ambiguities of the Act. When the plain
meaning method fails, as it often does when one party argues for a
different, yet reasonable, meaning of the statute, other tools of statutory
interpretation are required. The Katz, Jacques, Williams and ConAgra
courts did not rely solely on plain meaning; those courts instead
supplemented their decisions with an analysis of the legislative history
behind the ADA if they all determined "plain meaning" yields
unsatisfactorily results. 7 0
2. Legislative History
Rarely do courts rely on one method of statutory interpretation in
order to clarify an ambiguous statute.' 7 ' The ultimate goal of any court
in statutory interpretation is to determine the legislative intent behind the
statute and to effectuate that intent. 72 The Katz, Jacques and Williams
courts supplemented what they deemed deficient plain meaning
interpretations with evidence of the legislative history of the ADA.
However, like the plain meaning method of statutory interpretation, the
legislative intent method is inherently flawed. 1
73
It is illogical to believe that the ADA, a complicated bill passed by
hundreds of politicians, was drafted with each legislator having the same
168. See ConAgra, 422 F.3d at 1236. If the ADA made the "regarded as" issue
perfectly clear, there would have been no need for the litigation in Katz, Jacques and
Williams.
169. Kaplan v. N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The absence of a
stated distinction, however, is not tantamount to an explicit instruction by Congress that
'regarded as' individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodations."); Weber v. Strippit,
Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Fontanilla v. S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS,
2001 WL 513395, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001); Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 8,
Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, No. 04-873 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2004) ("The ambiguity arises
from reading together the various provisions of the ADA that address the duty to
accommodate, the definition of 'disability,' and the prohibition against discrimination.").
170. See ConAgra, 422 F.3d at 1236-37; Williams, 380 F.3d at 774; Katz, 87 F.3d at
32-33; Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166-68.
171. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 70, at 9-11 (the very essence of "dynamic" statutory
interpretation is to use several methods to reach the best interpretation).
172. See BRowN&BROWN,supra note 71, at 11.
173. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 70, at 15 ("A central problem is that it is unclear what
is meant by legislative 'intent.' Whose intent governs? How is it established?").
Compare CUETO-RUA, supra note 72, at 150-60 (simplifying the process of defining and
using the "will of the legislator"). See generally PoPKIN, supra note 70, at 121-25 (for a
background on the use of legislative history).
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interpretation of the bill.174  In addition to its intrinsic ambiguity,
legislative history is unreliable and can be manipulated to create an
interpretation which may never have been intended. 175 The context in
which a bill is enacted is different than the context in which the
subsequent law is applied. Those varied contexts will create different
interpretations.176
In Katz, the first case to address the "regarded as" issue arising
under the ADA, the First Circuit attempted to use legislative history to
supplement its reliance on the Act's plain language. 177 Consider, for
example, the relatively weak and defensive language employed by the
Katz court in the heart of the analysis:
Congress, when it provided for perception to be the basis of disability
status, probably had principally in mind the more usual case in which
a plaintiff has a long-term medical condition of some kind, and the
employer exaggerates its significance by failing to make a reasonable
accommodation. But both the language and the policy of the statute
seem to us to offer protection as well to one who is not substantially
disabled or even disabled at all but is wrongly perceived to be so.178
Despite the expressed wariness, the court chose to rely on its seemingly
tentative interpretation of the ADA's legislative history.
In 2002, the Jacques court attempted to provide a more thorough
analysis of the ADA's legislative history. 179 Interestingly, the court's
analysis of legislative history was guided almost exclusively by the
Supreme Court's decision in Arline, which dealt with the Rehabilitation
Act. 180 The Jacques court erred by not including an analysis of the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Arline.181 Due to the shifting
membership of the Court since 1987,182 the late Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent could now be the viewpoint of a majority.
Likewise, in Williams, the Third Circuit stated that the objective of
174. See BROwN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 12 ("The idea that the legislature had
one state of mind or 'legislative intent' when voting a bill into law is fiction.").
175. See id. at 49.
176. See id. at 14-16.
177. See Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996).
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 165-68 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
180. See id. See discussion supra Part II.A.
181. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289-93 (1987).
182. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 33 (2001) [hereinafter BAUM]. The
Court now includes Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Souter.
Id. More recently, Chief Justice John Roberts replaced the late Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, and Justice Samuel Alito replaced the retiring Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn in as Justice After Senate Gives Approval, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A21.
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the "regarded as" clause was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Arline.'83 The Williams court essentially made the same mistake that
both the Jacques court and Arline majority had made; the Arline decision
construed not the ADA, but the Rehabilitation Act.' 84 Some would argue
that Congress intentionally copied the "regarded as" language of the
Rehabilitation Act to the ADA, but the legislative history is silent on
such intent, and it, therefore, should not simply be inferred.185  The
Eleventh Circuit, in ConAgra, copied the Third Circuit's reasoning of the
connections between the Rehabilitation Act and ADA.1
8 6
In contrast, the Fontanilla court provided legislative history that
supported the conclusion that Congress did not intend to obligate
employers to reasonably accommodate employees "regarded as"
disabled.8 7 As the court noted, the ADA extended some protections to
workers "regarded as" disabled, but the guarantee of reasonable
accommodation was not one of the protections.'8 In the final House
report, two specific examples were provided of discrimination against
employees perceived as disabled, neither of which required
accommodation.'
8 9
Recognizing its inherent unreliability, many modem courts are
moving away from the use of legislative history for interpreting
statutes. 190 The flaws of the plain meaning and legislative history
approaches are evident when the statutes in question are applied to
different sets of facts.' 91 Sometimes, the application of a statute to a set
of facts leads to "bizarre results"; in such a case, the plain language of
the statute is abandoned in light of common sense. This approach has
183. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725.
184. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 278.
185. See Fontanilla v. S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 WL 513395, at *15 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 28, 2001).
186. See D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236-37 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
187. See Fontanilla, 2001 WL 513395, at *15. See also Michelle A. Travis, Leveling
the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair Advantage " Critique of Perceived
Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REv. 901, 902-71 (2000).
188. Fontanilla, 2001 WL 513395, at *15.
189. See id.
Example one involved a qualified and able-bodied worker who was fired
because an x-ray "reveal[ed] some anomaly, even though the person ha[d] no
symptoms of a back impairment." The second example involved workers who
suffered from cosmetic impairments but did not labor under any physical or
mental impairment that required accommodation by their employers.
Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 485(II1) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.S.C.A.N. 445.
190. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 70, at 225; see also SUMMERS, supra note 124, at 416-
17.
191. See SUMMERS, supra note 124, at 427.
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been deemed the "Golden Rule."'
' 92
3. The Golden Rule
The Golden Rule method of statutory interpretation dates back to
John Marshall, who served as Chief Justice in the nineteenth century.'
93
The underlying concept of the Golden Rule is that there exist certain
fundamental values that no statutory language can replace, the most
significant of which is common sense. 194 Historically, the Golden Rule
has been defined as deference to the text of the statute unless the statute's
application produced "absurd" or "bizarre results."' 195 If there are
potentially "bizarre results," some courts limit the text of the statute to
prevent further strange results.1
96
The modem formulation of the Golden Rule is essentially the same
in that an exception to the plain meaning exists when the text would
produce unjust or ridiculous results. 97 The logic behind the Golden Rule
is that those unjust results would never be intended by the legislature.'
98
Even textualists, such as Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist, use the Golden Rule when it is applicable.' 99
The Weber, Fontanilla, and Kaplan courts used the Golden Rule
very effectively to overcome the plain meaning reasoning of the First and
Third Circuits. 200  The Weber court first articulated concern for the
potential unjust results of the "regarded as" clause of the ADA.20 ' The
Weber court echoed the Third Circuit's concerns relating to: 1) healthy
employees using litigation to ask for changes in the work environment
under the name of reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities;
and 2) the potential windfall for impaired, but not disabled, employees
who would be entitled to accommodations that similarly situated
employees, who were not mistakenly labeled as disabled, would not
receive.20 2 The Weber court stated that Congress could not possibly have
intended this potential "windfall" for impaired employees, because it
192. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 40.
193. See POPKiN, supra note 70, at 174.
194. See id. at 20-21.
195. See id. 75.
196. See id.
197. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 71, at 40.
198. See U.S. v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
199. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 70, at 44-45.
200. See Kaplan v. N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber v.
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999); Fontanilla v. S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS,
2001 WL 513395, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001).
201. See Weber, 186 F.3d at 917.
202. Id., citing Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148-49 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998);
Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 195 (3d Cir. 1999).
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would create a "disparity in treatment among impaired but non-disabled
employees., 20 3 The court reasoned that some impaired but non-disabled
employees would receive reasonable accommodation because of
misperceptions by the employer, and other impaired but non-disabled
employees would not.204
The Golden Rule adequately addresses these potential unjust results
by limiting the plain meaning of the text. The Fontanilla court echoed
the Weber reasoning and noted the "bizarre results" of applying the Katz
interpretation of the ADA. 20 5 The court went on to provide a detailed
analysis of the ambiguity of the ADA's plain language.20 6
In Kaplan, the Ninth Circuit noted that under the Katz
interpretation, employees were better off if their employers treated them
as disabled even if they were not.207 The court reasoned, "[t]his would
be a perverse and troubling result under a statute aimed at decreasing
'stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
[people with disabilities].' 2 8 Finally, the court stated that employers'
limited resources are better spent on reasonably accommodating those
employees who are actually disabled and in need, rather than
unnecessarily wasting resources on employees mistakenly perceived as
disabled.20 9 This is a pragmatic argument not really supported by text.
It is absolutely necessary to correct these "bizarre results. 210° The
Golden Rule is based upon the premise that when the plain meaning of a
statute leads to unjust results, deference to the text must be limited to
avoid those results. 21' The Jacques court noted that employers
stigmatized impaired employees who were mistakenly perceived as
disabled, and thus those employees deserved reasonable
accommodation.1 2 But, as the Kaplan court later noted, the ADA was
intended to avoid stereotypes, and a literal interpretation of the Act only
213encourages stereotyping.
203. Weber, 186 F.3d at 917.
204. Id.
205. See Fontanilla, 2001 WL 513395, at *14.
206. Id. at * 15.
207. See Kaplan v. N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
208. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1990).
209. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232.
210. Cf Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 11, Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't v.
Williams, No. 04-873 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005). "In short, the 'windfall' theory proves too
much because the purported 'windfall' is only that the 'regarded as' employee receives
the same protection as an employee who actually is disabled---exactly what Congress
plainly intended in enacting the ADA." Id.; see also Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth.
Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725.
211. See supra note 192.
212. See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
213. See supra note 208.
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Most recently, the Williams court attempted to reconcile its plain
meaning interpretation with the Golden Rule argument.214 All that this
Third Circuit opinion did provide was yet another example of when a
literal interpretation of the "regarded as" clause would make sense.215
The court did not actually address the potentially "bizarre results" of a
literal interpretation of the ADA. Faced with an argument that it had laid
the foundation for five years earlier,216 the court opted to remain silent on
the Weber/Kaplan line of reasoning. 17
The Eleventh Circuit, however, reasoned that it was beyond the
court's authority to "pass judgment on the wisdom of a congressional
intent. ' '218 The court suggested there was a separation of powers concern
implicated by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' use of the Golden Rule.219
C. Reconciling the Split
The plain meaning reasoning advanced by the First, Third and
Eleventh Circuits makes little sense in light of the potentially "bizarre"
and perhaps inequitable results. Plain meaning and legislative history are
inherently unreliable methods of statutory interpretation. With the
federal circuits deeply split, it is time for the United States Supreme
Court to resolve the issue of reasonable accommodation for "regarded
as" disabled employees. Given the current membership of the Court, it is
doubtful the Court would rule that the ADA mandates employers must
reasonably accommodate "regarded as" disabled employees.
The modem Court enjoyed, until recently, the aggressive leadership
of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist.22 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist authored
the dissenting opinion in Arline, in which Justice Scalia joined.221 Justice
Brennan, author of the majority opinion in Arline, has since left the Court
and passed away.222 With the additions of Justice Thomas, Justice Alito,
and Chief Justice Roberts, it is conceivable that the Arline decision
would carry little persuasive weight in an ADA "regarded as" case.
Despite the fact that Justices Scalia and Thomas are both champions
of the new textualist movement, they have supported the use of the
214. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775-76.
215. See id. at 775.
216. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1999); Taylor v.
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1999).
217. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775-76 (noticing a lack of any substantive analysis of
the "bizarre results" argument).
218. D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1238 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
219. See id. at 1238-39.
220. See BAUM, supra note 179, at 130-3 1.
221. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289-93 (1987).
222. See BAUM, supra note 182, at 74.
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Golden Rule when necessary.223 Justice Scalia has already gone on
record against affording reasonable accommodation to an employee
mistakenly "regarded as" handicapped. 4 It is difficult to imagine a
situation where Justice Thomas would vote against his conservative
brethren.225 If a case such as ConAgra were to reach the Supreme Court,
the "regarded as" employees should not, and likely would not, receive
the benefits of reasonable accommodation.
IV. Conclusion
Since its passage in 1990, the ADA has been the subject of heated
debate. The issue of affording reasonable accommodation to employees
"regarded as" disabled is just one ambiguous section of the Act. Since
the Katz decision in 1996, the debate over the "regarded as" issue has
evolved into a circuit split, recently deepened with the Eleventh Circuit's
ruling in ConAgra.
A series of fundamental choices made by the judiciary of the
various circuits which have ruled on this issue is at the root of this circuit
split. The Third and Eleventh Circuits have chosen to adopt the
reasoning of Justice Brennan's interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act in
Arline. The Williams and ConAgra courts believe Congress intentionally
copied the wording of the "regarded as" clause from the Rehabilitation
Act to the ADA, in light of the Arline decision.
In contrast, the Weber and Kaplan courts seem to reject this
altruistic, and perhaps misplaced, faith in the legislature. The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits heeded the advice the late Chief Justice Rehnquist offered
in his Arline dissent, criticizing the majority's liberal interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act. This is not to mention that the Rehabilitation Act is
not applicable to an ADA analysis.
It is easy to accept the plain text of the ADA as affording reasonable
accommodation to those employees "regarded as" disabled. But, as
Rehnquist's dissent in Arline and opinions in Weber and Kaplan make
clear, once plain meaning construction is applied to the Act, it becomes
clear that courts cannot simply rely upon the text to produce justifiable
results. Case law demonstrates the dangerous "bizarre results" that arise
from using a plain language approach to interpret the ADA.
The legal system must certainly combat the discrimination of
disabled persons. However, interpreting the ADA to treat impaired, but
223. See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 44-45.
224. See Sch. Bd. Of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289-93 (1987).
225. See BAUM, supra note 182, at 146-51. A scalogram of the justices' voting
patterns for the 1997 and 1998 terms shows that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas vote
on the same side of an issue over eighty percent of the time. Id. at 150-51.
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non-disabled, employees differently based on how they are perceived in
the workplace would be at the very least ironic, and at the very worst,
discrimination.

